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ABS TRACT
Privatization of state assets is an essentialstep to the
creation of a viable private sector in the formerly socialist
economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A standard
approach to the problem has rapidly emerged. Small firms are
being privatized by sale very rapidly. The strategy then turns
to larger industrial firms, which are to be corporatizedas soon
as possible, moved out of the shelter of the ministries that now
in principle control them, and put under the direction of
corporate boards; at the next stage the intention is to
distribute shares, through sale or free transfer, to some
combination of current workers in the firms, currentmanagement,
mutual funds, holding companies, banks, insurance companies,
pension funds, citizens, and the government. I analyze the
standard approach and alternatives, as well as progress in
implementing privatization, with emphasis on Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. Progress in privatizing small firms has been
rapid in several East European countries, but privatization of








PRIVATIZATIONIN EAST EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION
Stanley Fischer1
The creation of a viable private sector, owning and managing the bulk of
theeconomy's assets, is the essence of the transformation problem in formerly
socialist economies (FSE5). And since virtually all production is currently
carried out in the state sector, privatization of state assets is an essential
step in the creation of the private sector.
Advice from most Western institutions and economists on how to privatize
has rapidly converged on a standard approach. Small firms should be
privatized by sale almost immediately, perhaps with some financing provided by
the state. Larger industrial firms should be corporatized as soon as
possible, moved out of the shelter of the ministries that now in principle
control them, and put under the direction of corporate boards; shares should
be distributed to some combination of current workers in the firms, current
management, mutual funds, holding companies, banks, insurance companies,
pension funds, citizens, and the government.2 Plans envisage the
1Professor of Economics, MIT, and Research Associate, NBER and Institute for
Policy Reform (IPR). This paper was prepared for the IRIS-IPR conference on
Transition to a Market Economy, Prague, March 24-27 1991.
2For a review of such plans, see Borensztein and Kumar (1990), and Milanovic
(1990); see also details of proposals and analysis in Blanchard et al (1990),
Feige (1990), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1990), Crosfeld (1990), Lipton and
Sachs (1990), and Tirole (1991). Tirole (1991) draws on the industrial
organization literature in analyzing principles that should guide the
privatization process. The absence from this paper of plans presented in
languages other than English is unfortunate: the richness of the debate within
each country can be discerned by reading authors familiar with those
literatures, for example Kornai (1990) on flungary.-2-
corporatization phase being completed within a year or two. In most variants
the initial post-corporatization ownership structure is transitional, because
the government retains a large ownership share, and because the holding
companies (or their equivalent) are to be phased out. The period from
corporacizacion to full private ownership of firms that are to be privatized
is generally expected to last several years, and in some instances, up to a
decade.
Ownership reform in agriculture, housing, and land, has drawn less
attention than industrial and commercial restructuring. The issues are less
difficult in the cases of housing and land than for operating enterprises; in
agriculture, there is already a significant private sector to build on in
Poland, and some private sector activities in other FSEs. While Bulgaria and
Romania passed land reform laws early in 1991, there has as yet been little
privatization of land.
The standard advice does nor draw complete agreement. Kornai (1990),
along with others, argues that state assets should be sold and not given away.
The role of the holding companies or mututal funds has not been entirely
clarified (Hinds, 1990): privatization plans for Czechoslovakia place less
emphasis on holding companies than those for Poland, which in any case are
more eclectic concerning the role of financial institutions than some earlier
proposals.3 Hungary is relying more on privatization from below, initiated by
the firm, than other countries. Some, basing their advice on the finding by
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and others that successful privatization in the U.K.
required the privatized firm to operate in a competitive environment, believe
3Gontrast for instance, the proposals in Lipton and Sachs (1990), with the
program of the Government of Poland (1990).-3-
that demonopolization should precede privatization. Other questions remain
open. What is the role of foreigners? How should firms that are not yet
privatized be managed? Is it necessary, as argued for instance by Brainard
(1990), to build up the banking system before privatizing? What other sources
of finance can be created?
The debate over privatization has been intensely practical, conducted in
real time with real interactions between the academic literature and policy.
By early 1991 major legislation had been passed in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, and of course the former East
Germany; significant small case privatization and some large firm
privatization is taking place.4 While it cannot yet be claimed that there is
a wealth of experience of privatization in FSEs on which to draw, the
experience -andcertainly the legislation --isgrowing.
In this paper, I reexamine the main issues in privatization in the PSEs,
drawing on experience of privatization in Poland and Hungary, and to some
extent in Czechoslovakia.5 In Section I I set Out the standard approach in
more detail, and discuss privatization of small and medium scale enterprises.
Then in Section II I discuss the privatization of the core of large industrial
and commercial firms. The privatization of financial intermediaries, housing,
agriculture, and land, are discussed briefly in Section III. Conclusions are
presented in Section IV.
4Developmentsin Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia through late 1990 are
reviewed in Milanovic (1990).
do not describe the privatization process in Yugoslavia, where
implementation has been heavily affected by political instability. The
Yugoslavian approach was interesting because labor management and ownership
was most heavily entrenched there. See Milanovic (1990).-4-
I. The Standard Approach
The sheer scale of the privatization needed in the FSEs makes the problem
very different front that faced by other countries that have undertaken major
privatization programs. Table 1 presents data on the share of the state
sector in value added in commercial and industrial activities in different
countries during the 1980s. The largest completed privatization program so
far is that of post-Allende Chile, which moved firms producing about 25
percent of Cr11' into the private sector, some of them firms that had only
recently been nationalized. The much-studied U.K. program shifted only about
4.5 percent of CNP and employment out of the state sector.
Table 1: SHARIOFSTATE SECTOR IN VALUE ADDED
Czechoslovakia (1986) 97.0







West Cermany (1982) 10.7
United Kingdom (1983) 10.7
United States (1983) 1.3
Source: Milanovic (1990)
Reforming governments have opted for the principle of rapid
privatization. This choice reflects their commitment to move decisively from
socialism to capitalism, avoiding as far as possible any detours into a third
way. The experience of privatization in almost all developing countries has-5-
been disappointing:6 the loss of patronage and political rents attendant on
privatization reduce its attractiveness to the political system.7 This
experience, along with the political need for a credible reform program in the
face of the unprecedented scale of the privatization necessary in FSEs,
accounts for the decision to go for rapid privatization. Even though
credibility demands that an irreversible program be put in place as rapidly as
possible, it is clear that the process of privatization will take many years.
It is also likely that the relative decline of the state sector will after a
few years result more from an increase in production by new private firms than
from privatization.
The issue of the ownership rights of current employees confronts all the
reforming countries, particularly because the decentralization programs of
former communist governments typically moved in the direction of worker
management. The issue arises most forcefully in considering spontaneous
privatizations, in which current employees in one way or another privatize the
firm for their own benefit. The standard approach argues that existing
workers have no special claims on the firm's assets on fairness grounds. For
instance, why should industrial workers obtain larger claims on capital than
workers in less capital intensive industries, such as teaching? Or why should
workers in successful firms become wealthier than those in less successful
firms? Although it is likely in the latter case that workers in more
6See the special issue of World Development,Hay 1989, that focuses on
developing countries, but also examines lessons from the U.K.
7Any political economy model of slow or halting privatization would have also
to account for the fact that state sectors stopped growing in the eighties,
and that many of them began to recede. Any such model would include a
political tradeoff between the efficiency of production and the availability
of rents; the perceived terms of that tradeoff must have changed in the 1980s.-6-
successful firms have on average worked harder and invested more than those iii
lesssuccessful firms, the general point is correct. However political power
as well as fairness shapes privatization programs, and it has already been
decided that existing workers will receive special treatment, at least in
Poland and Hungary.
Similarly, the issue of the rights of former owners is a live one in
several countries, most notably East Cermany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
Explicit legal treatment of the rights of former owners not only strengthens
the credibility of a country's commitment to the rights of private property,
but also prevents the legal confusion over ownership that could arise if the
issue were left to be settled later in the courts. However, redress can be
provided to former owners in a way that does not slow the privatization
process: to achieve this, the original owners would be given the right to
compensation, by the state, rather than rights to the property itself. New
owners will find it difficult to get on with running their businesses if they
face the possibility of claims for restitution by former owners.
The standard approach summarized in Table 2 is not monolithic. ft is
standard in rejecting a case-by-case approach to privatization along U.K.
lines -- onthe grounds that the process would take far too long, in
separating as the heart of the issue the core of large commercial and
industrial enterprises, and in insisting on rapid progress in establishing the
principle and the fact of private ownership. It has not yet devoted as much
attention to the privatization of other assets and industries. There are
however many important details on which different plans, including those
already embodied in legislation, differ. Borensztein and Kumar (1990) list-7-
six different distributive plans;8 if they were writing now they would have to
add the programs passed by the Czechoslovak and Polish parliaments, which do
not exactly coincide with any of their six.
Table 2: THE STANDARD APPROACH
1. Small commercial and industrial firms.
Privatize fast, by sale, if necessary with special financial
arrangements, including leasing.
1. "Micro" enterprises, such as small retail stores can
be sold very rapidly.
2. "Small and medium"scaleenterprises can either be (a) first
corporatized and shares then disposed of through sale to an
individual or group, or (b) the assets sold or leased after
liquidation of the state enterprise (as in the 1990 Polish
legislation).
2. "Core" of large industrial and comniercial firms.
1. Corporatize or commercialize, setting up corporate boards
Issue: Membership of boards and control of firms
2. Privatize by distributing or selling shares.
Issues: Speed of privatization, types of firms privatized, and
extent of restructuring before privatization
Share sales or free distributions
To whom (roles of foreigners and former owners)
Role of financial institutions (mutual funds, holding
companies) between corporations and households
Does the government hold back shares for later sale,
and role of stable core of investors.
3. Financial institutions, housing, land, agriculture..
Small commercial and industrial firms.
Existing small firms, typically in retail trade and distribution, are
being privatized fast. The privatizing agency may be the local rather than a
8These six are presented under theheadings:citizen shares (Feige); vouchers
(Romania); financial intermediaries (Frydman/Rapaczynski); financial
intermediaries (Lipton/Sachs); privatization agencies (Blanchard); and self-
management.-8-
higher level of government. Very rapid progress has been made in this area in
Poland, where most shops had been privatized by the end of 1990; governments
in Czechoslovakia expect to sell over 100.000 small firms in 1991 -- with
auctions having begun in February; and Hungary expects to privatize most of
retail trade this spring. More public sales of small firms, especially in
transportation and distribution, can be expected as larger vertically
integrated firms are restructured, and parts are sold off separately. The
number of new privately owned small firms in the reforming countries far
exceeds the number of privatized firms. For example, by one estimate there
were 200,000 small firms in Poland in November 1990, of which more than 80
percent were newly created rather than privatized.9
Despite the rapid increase in the number of firms, problems of both
financing and red tape are frequently reported. Any banking system would have
difficulty in appraising small firms headed by new entrepreneurs wanting to
operate in a new and highly uncertain economic environment; all the more so
would the underdeveloped banking systems of the FSEs. The red tape is a
holdover from socialism and underdevelopment. The financing problem for
privatizations can be mitigated if the state or local government provides term
loans or leases that enable the purchasers to pay for their assets slowly.
The financing problems of new firms can be addressed through rapid banking
sector reform, for instance by creating new banks or separate entities within
existing banks to finance new firms, perhaps using externally provided
finance.
9mese data are taken from Jackson (1990), whowarns of their likely
imprecision.-9-
There is an intermediate class of "small and usediwn" scaleenterprises,
about 5,500 of them in Poland (where the core group of the largestcompanies
consists of 500 firms.) Polish legislation proposes an extremely eclectic
approach for the privatization of these companies, to be carried out by
representatives of the government with the firms taking the initiative. The
legislation envisages some firms being corporatized and shares distributed.
The privatization may be initiated by a prospective buyer, who willbuy a
significant bloc of shares; employees will be entitled to some of the shares,
free. Other shares may be sold through auction, public offer, ornegotiated
sale, with stock exchange listings to follow. Alternatively, small and medium
scale firms may be liquidated and the assets disposed of through sale,through
absorption of the assets into a new company, or through lease, whichmay also
offer the right of purchase. The legislation envisages few restrictionson
these sales, aside from the setting of a minimum price. Under thisheading.
firms could also be sold to their current employees. Important issues that
will arise in the privatization of the largest firms, such as the treatment of
the firm's debt, will have to be handled here too. Presumably the firms that
are more heavily indebted are likely to be liquidated before being disposed
of, though it is not yet clear how the creditors will be compensated, if at
all. The eclecticism of the approach to the privatization of these small and
medium scale enterprises in Poland is justified by the need to move fast.1°
While the privatization of small firms has received less attention than
that of large firms, its importance should not be underestimated. Future
growth is more likely to come from firms in this size class than from the
10The eclectic approach described in thisparagraph is being followed also for
larger firms in Hungary (see Bokros, 1990), as will be discussed below.- 10-
largerfirms, so that the rapid progress that has already taken place in the
development of micro enterprises, and the rapid pace of privatization that is
possible for small and medium scale enterprises, can make a key contribution
to the development of market economies in the FSEs.
11. Core of larte industrial and commercial firms.
The core of largest firms (500 firms in Poland. 5000 in the USSR)
accounts for the bulk of industrial output. Typically these firms are larger
and more vertically integrated than they would be in a market economy. In
considering such firms, we distinguish those that are close to being natural
monopolies and are publicly owned in many market economies, such as the
railroads and telephone company, from firms that have no such claim, such as
heavy industry. The latter are likely to face competition from new entry and
from imports, while the former are not. Given the need to develop a
regulatory framework for the quasi-natural monopolies,11 and the time
pressures on competent government bureaucrats, the privatization of such firms
is likely to be left for later.
Corporatizat ion.
Corporatization (or commercialization) of the core firms is expected to
take place quickly. In Poland, it is estimated that over half of the largest
500 firms will be corporatized in 1991 and the remainder in 1992. At the end
of the corporatizatjon process, the firm has a legal structure similar to that
of most state-owned enterprises in market economies. The Board of Directors
11They are described as quasi-natural monopolies because there is a potential
role for competition in many such industries --suchas telephone
communications.- 11-
willbe primarily responsible to the goverruuent12, which will appoint the bulk
of the members. Workers are also to be represented on corporate boards in
several countries: while this can be seen as a vestige of worker management,
it is also a feature of Cerman corporations.
The performance of the newly corporatized firms will depend on the
quality of both management and corporate boards. Current management is likely
to be retained initially, but both management consultants and management
contracts can be used to improve the quality of current management. Technical
assistance funds are likely to be available to help finance the use of foreign
consultants and managers. Management training on a large scale is also
beginning; foreign financing is likely to available for this purpose as well.
There is nonetheless no doubt that the quality of management should improve
over time as more experience is gained of working in a market environment.
The quality and independence of the boards of directors will also be an
important influence on the performance of the firm and the completion of its
privatization. Civen their knowledge of the operations of the firm, it would
seem natural to put the bureaucrats who were formerly responsible for the
firms onto the boards. Where exceptional individuals are involved, that will
help; but in general the practice is unlikely to be productive. New directors
can be trained, as is happening in Poland. Foreign experience can be drawn on
by putting one or two foreign businessmen on the more important boards. The
12The government agency to which the SOEs will be responsible differs from
country to country. Czechoslovakia and its constituent States will set up
Funds of National Property to which the assets will belong, and which will be
responsible for privatization. In Poland, the commercialized firms will
belong to the Treasury but their privatization will be carried out by the
Ministry of ownership Transformation. In Hungary, the State Property Agency
has to approve privatizations.- 12-
qualityof the boards will improve with experience, and government will have
to keep a watchful eye at the early stages.
There is a general issue of the extent to which (a) firms and (b)
industries, should be restructured before privatization. This "triage" phase
of the privatization program has not received much attention, but the
difficulties that beset the Treuhandanstalt, which draws on a large stable of
former west German business executives, suggest that it could take longer and
be much more difficult than expected. Some of the newly corporatized firms
will lose money. It is not at all clear how the government will decide which
firms to subsidize before privatizing, and which to close down or liquidate.
Given that many of the largest firms in FSEs are excessively vertically
integrated, there is a good case for attempting a relatively rapid
restructuring of the firm before privatization. The separate pieces will
probably be easier to sell than the whole. Restructuring of an industry will
not be necessary so long as the firms that are privatized face potential
competition from abroad and from new entries; as argued above, there are
advantages to privatizing firms that are likely to remain monopolies
relatively late, after a regulatory framework is in place.
The government and corporate boards will also have to decide how far to
restructure firm balance sheets before privatization)-3 The firms'
liabilities to banks, inter-enterprise credits, and the treatment of implicit
or explicit pension liabilities, will be at issue. Direct sales of some firms
are anticipated in all countries, and in these cases balance sheet
restructuring will be part of the negotiations and will help determine the
13This is the key problem in privatizing bamks, to be discussed below.- 13-
salesprice. There is less need to restructure the balance sheet where firms
are being given away, provided the shares in different firms are distributed
equitably over the population. However, the management of newly privatizeci
firms will have enough on their plates in operating in the new market
environment without also having to engage in extensive debt negotiations, so
that cleaning up of balance sheets would be helpful -- andoffsetting
cancellations of inter-enterprise credits should not be too expensive for the
government.
Sale or Distribution of Shares.
The first choice after commercialization is whether to sell shares or
give them away, or both. This decision involves tradeoffs among the speed of
privatization, the amount of revenue that can be raised, and the ownership
role of foreigners. Because of the difficulties of valuation of companies, a
commitment to rapid sale on a large scale would imply low revenues; because
domestic financial intermediaries are weak, and there are few individuals with
the necessary resources, rapid sale would imply a large ownership share for
foreigners. Accordingly most countries envisage rapid free distribution of
some shares to the public. Thirty percent is being distributed in Romania, a
complicated formula applies in Poland, and Czechoslovakia is using its voucher
scheme to distribute between 40 and 80 percent of each privatized company to
the public.
Free distribution of shares would be unattractive if the main motive for
privatization were to raise government revenue. The revenue motive has been
important for governments in other countries, including the U.K., and added
revenue would no doubt be welcome to FSE governments at the start of the
reform process. Nonetheless, revenue is not the main goal; rather it is to- 14-
movefirms rapidly into the private sector, with the intention of increasing
their efficiency and that of the economy. With an eye on future revenues,
governments generally plan to hold back some shares for later sale.
In Poland shares will be distributed 30 percent to the public, 20 percent
to the pension system, 10 percent each to commercial banks and workers, and
the remaining 30 percent will be held by the government. The distribution to
the pension system makes sense as a means of funding existing pension
liabilities and thereby reducing future calls on general revenues; further, by
funding the pension system the government encourages the principle of funded
rather than transfer pension schemes.
Two arguments can be made in favor of bank share ownership. First, the
banks have some financial expertize, so that their ownership of equity will
help improve the efficiency of the stock market. Second. share distribution
to banks is a means of building up banks' assets and correspondingly their
capital in advance of the balance sheet restructurings and writedowns that
have to come. Since some of the assets written down will be loans to the
firms whose shares are being distributed, there is some logic in compensating
the banks in advance. However, share distribution gives the banks assets of
highly uncertain value at a time when the value of their assets is in any case
unknown, and when the main need is to restore the safety of banks and
confidence in them. Bank share ownership would also give them inappropriate
incentives to lend to firms in which they have an ownership interest. If
shares are to be distributed to banks, it would be possible to hold the shares
earmarked for banks in a separate general fund, which could be used later to
infuse funds into banks that need them, and to restructure bank balance sheets
with safer assets.- 15-
InCzechoslovakia vouchers for the purchase of shares will be distributed
to all citizens, with the government retaining at least 20 percent to deal
with claims on the firms made by former owners. The proportions are reversed
in Romania, where the government retains 70 percent. Although there are
fiscal reasons for the government to retain shares, the more it does so, the
less credible is its commitment to move rapidly to a private ownership market
economy.
The voucher schemes have to be completed by a pseudo-market to establish
the initial voucher prices of firms. Triska and Jelinek-Francjs (1990)
discuss alternative schemes for the initial allocation of shares, favoring a
pro-rata allocation method in which the number of shares an individual
receives in a given company is equal to his or her pro-rata share in the total
bids for that firm.
While this method would clear the market, some alternative schemes being
considered would not, at least not rapidly. A "tatonnement" is proposed for
Czechoslovak privatization: initial prices will be set for 2000 companies.
individuals will then tender vouchers for shares in individual firms, prices
will be changed on the basis of the excess of supply or demand of shares, and
the process repeated. Despite its conformity with the textbooks, this process
has few benefits to recommend it. The information on which individuals base
their bids for shares must be extremely imperfect, and the final prices
correspondingly poor guides to investment decisions. Under these
circumstances, there are advantages to the alternative of distributing shares
in mutual funds to individuals, on an equitable basis, and allowing the mutual
funds to trade in the shares of individual companies. Individuals would be
allowed to sell mutual fund shares after a specified period, say two years.- 16-
Therole of foreigners
The potential role of foreigners has been a matter of concern in all the
FSEs. Countries want the benefits of foreign expertize and foreign finance.
But they are concerned that, in the absence of domestic sources of finance,
foreigners will acquire a large part of industry at fire-sale prices.
Accordingly at the same time as countries seek foreign expertize. for instance
in the form of technical assistance or management contracts, they make
provisions to control the share of foreign ownership. For instance, in the
auctions of small firms in Czechoslovakia, foreigners were not allowed to bid
in the first round. Similarly the distribution of ownership shares or
vouchers to citizens or residents limits the initial extent of foreign
ownership.
These limits may appear redundant at present when there is no large flow
of foreign finance into the FSEs. However some limits may be necessary since
large scale foreign purchases at low prices could discredit the entire
privatization process. Further, governments have shown their interest in
negotiating or encouraging joint ventures and other means of foreign
participation. Contraints on foreign ownership can be relaxed once the
privatization process is well established.
The Hunmarian difference.
Practice in Hungary will differ from that in the other countries in two
major respects. First, there will be greater reliance on privatizations
initiated by the firms themselves. These "privatizations from below" continue
to be referred to as spontaneous privatizations (e.g. Bokros, 1990). However,
the spontaneous privatizations that led to an outcry in Hungary and other
countries in 1989 usually referred to a particularly favorable deal that- 17-
involvedeither the current management or other members of the nomenklatura.
Since 1989 all Hungarian privatizations have had to be approved by the State
Property Agency, which has exercised its right of refusal in almost one third
of the cases it has considered. The State Property Agency also intendsto
initiate privatizations, and will consider proposals originating fron
potential purchasers. Hungary hopes to privatize one-third of state assets
within the next three years.
Second, Hungary has hardly accepted the principle of free distribution of
shares. Kornai (1990) argues strongly that property should be purchased, and
that the basis of the new system will be undermined if it starts witha free
gift. Bokros (1990) allows for some distribution of vouchers, but refers to
free distribution of shares as a marginal solution that is part of a social
compensatory scheme rather than a series attempt at privatization, adding
(p.7) "it is not considered seriously as part of any 'grand design' even by
social researchers and leftist intellectuals". The arguments in favor of free
distribution on an equitable basis are that the property has already been paid
for by the population, and that those currently able to purchase assetsmay
have obtained their wealth illegitimately. Countering theargument that
property acquired freely is unlikely to be treated seriously. Hinds (1990)
points out that individuals who inherit property do not seem to mistreat it.
While the argument against free distribution is not compelling, Hungary does
avoid the complication of the free distribution schemes that some form of
concentrated ownership or control has then to be introduced, for example the
holding companies.
The pragmatic Hungarian approach is making progress more rapidly than the
alternative approaches being followed in other countries. There is a tradeoff- 18-
betweenthe speed with which the privatization process takes place and the
fairness of the process. Speed matters.
The development of a stock market.
All privatization programs envisage a major role for a stock market.
While there has been considerable scepticism about the absolute efficiency of
the U.S. stock market in the academic literature (e.g. Shiller, 1989), the
question is one of relative rather than absolute efficiency -- andhere it is
difficult to envisage any other arrangement that will perform the information
processing and corporate control functions that a stock market provides.
However the importance of the stock market varies across countries, with the
banks playing a relatively more important role especially in Germany.
It will take some time to develop stock markets with the necessary depth
and efficiency. Hungary has already institituted a stock market. Poland has
decided to follow the French model of the stock market, stock registration.
and clearing, in part because of the technical assistance offered. A
securities commission is also being set up, with training assistance from the
United States SEC. The Securities Commission will register securities to be
traded, license brokers and mutual funds, promulgate and enforce regulations,
and attempt to educate the public. Limited trading on the Polish market has
already begun.
Mutual funds and holding companies.
It is unlikely that an efficient stock market can be developed until
shares begin to be exchanged for money rather than vouchers or other shares.
The share or voucher distribution schemes lead to widely dispersed share
ownership, and raise concerns about both the efficiency of the stock market
and the role that shareowners can play in corporate control. If all- 19 -
shareholdersare small, none of them has much incentive to do the research
that will lead to efficient asset pricing. Further, small widely dispersed
shareowners cannot exercise control over corporate boards and management
because they lack the financial resources to back their judgment with salesor
purchases of shares.
Two approaches have been suggested to deal with these problems. The
first is to develop institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual
funds. The second is to set up self-liquidating holding companies. For
simplicity we refer to these as the mutual fund and holding company proposals
respectively. It is taken for granted that it would in any case be desirable
to encourage institutional investors such as pension funds, and that can be
done immediately under any approach in which shares are distributed rather
than sold. Pension funds will also develop over the course of time as newly
privatized firms have to provide pensions for their employees. The sooner
these institutions can begin trading in the stock market for money, the more
rapidly the stock market can develop.
The difference between the-mutual fund and holding company approaches is
that the mutual funds are expected to take a more passive role in management.
The creation of mutual funds will solve the problem of uninformed investors.
The mutual funds can be set up either (a) by allocating shares in companies to
them, and then allocating shares in mutual funds to individuals, or (b) by
allocating vouchers to individuals to bid for shares in mutual companies.
Scheme (a) would be preferable, since there can at the beginning bevery
little information on the basis of which individuals would bid under scheme
(b). Some thought has also been given in Poland to the establishment of
financial intermediaries, such as mutual funds, that will obtain outside- 20
capital (including foreign capital) and purchase shares rather than be given
them (Jedrzejczak, 1990). In any case, foreign experts are expected to take
part in the management of financial institutions, including mutual funds.
Mutual funds would exercise discipline over company management by sales
and purchases of shares. Managers should be given stock options to ensure
that stock price movements affect their actions, though the question of
whether they would act in an excessively short-sighted (supposedly American)
rather than long-term (supposedly Japanese) fashion is open. A sufficient
number of mutual funds --atleast 15 in the smaller countries, more in the
Soviet Union -- willhave to be created for the stock market to operate
efficiently. The efficiency of the market will depend also on the composition
of the funds' share holdings. Each firm should initially be owned by more
than one mutual fund, but shares should be distributed in a way that allows
mutual funds to specialize in gathering information. After a short while the
mutual funds should be allowed to purchase or sell whatever shares they want.
Over the course of time specialized funds can be expected to develop.
An important question arises of when trading for money can begin, and how
liquidity is to be infused into the stock market. Mutual funds would need
initial financial capital to be able to buy and sell shares formoney rather
than other shares. The Source of this capital is not clear; the State could
provide mutual funds with initial capital, other institutions such as pension
funds, or individuals, could invest in the mutual funds. It would probably be
advisable to limit both the volumeoftrading and the participation of
individuals in the early days of the stock market. For example, the mutual
funds could be kept as closed end funds, and individuals allowed to sellonly
sore portion of their initial holdings, during an initial period such as the- 21-
firstyear after the stock market is opened, or after shares are distributed
(since not all shares will be distributed at the beginning).
Holding companies would take a more active role in the management of
companies. The holding companies would be represented and take an active role
on corporate boards. Shares would be distributed so that each firm is
allocated predominantly, but certainly not exclusively, to oneholding
company. To prevent monopolization, the holding companies should not be
specialized in particular industries. The number of holding companies should
be sufficiently large to make collusion difficult. This wouldrequire at
least 20 companies in a country like Poland.
The holding Companies would be set up not only to concentrate
information in the stock market, but also because effectivemanagement in a
market economy -- particularlyfinancial management --willbe scarce in the
early transition stages in the FSEs. The holding companies would be expected
to include the best corporate managers, and also to draw on foreignexperts in
managing Companies.
There are two major fears about the holding companies: first, that if
they are badly run, they can create more difficulties than they solve; and
second,that they will end up essentially reproducing the ministries that they
are designed to replace. There is no way of ensuring that the holding
companies run well. They face a formidable management task in bringing a
large number of companies into the market economy, and in closing the firms
that will not make it. Management incentives that tie compensation to stock
market performance or the profitability of their firms will help, but cannot
substitute for management skills that operatives in market economies have
acquired through on-the-job and academic training over long periods.- 22-
Itis inevitable that the holding companies would in part be managed by
those who have managed companies in the past. The holding companies could
also have enormous power. This means there is a real possibility the holding
companies would end up acting like the ministries that they are in effect
replacing. This danger can be mitigated by ensuring that there is competition
among holding companies within each industry, and by supervising the holding
companies. However their possession of superior information makes supervision
difficult.
Blanchard (1990) suggests that the holding companies should be self-
liquidating, required to sell off their companies over the course of time and
with a specified end-date. They would thus serve as privatization agencies.
This is a worthwhile suggestion for preventing the economic dominance of
holding companies, even though the example of the industrial groups in Japan
tempts the thought that holding companies may also be an efficient way of
organizing industry.
There is no need to use only one or the other method -.mutualfunds, or
holding companies -- exclusively.Larger firms can be privatized
individually, smaller ones can be privatized through holding companies (with
the shares distributed to holding companies without creating cartels or
monopolies), and mutual funds can hold shares of both the larger companies and
holding companies.
The remaining shares.
In each of the share distribution proposals, the government retains a
significant percentage of ownership, sufficient to make it the largest
shareholder. A benevolent government would be able to use this power to
improve firm performance, but there is no reason to expect the governments of- 23 -
FSEsto behave differently than other governments, It is unwise for the
government to continue to hold these shares for very long. Governments should
commit themselves to divesting through some mechanism as soon aspossible,
when it is clear that a company is operating successfully in theprivate
sector.
Lipton and Sachs (1990) suggest that the government seek out a "stable
core" of investors whowillconstitute the ownership and management nucleus of
each company, and sell its shares to them. The possibility of thegovernment
at any time being able to sell off 30 percent of the shares, at aprice of its
choosing, would subject any other negotiations for share sales togreat
uncertainty. Thus it would be appropriate for the government to seek out
purchasers during the early phases of privatization, in collaboration with the
corporate managment, but not to continue to exercise its implicit control
after the firm is established in the private sector.
Financing needs.
One major difficulty with the proposal to distribute rather than sell
shares is that companies are very likely to need financial capitalas they
begin operating in a market environment. Depending on how thegovernment
treats the proceeds of sales, companies that are sold can acquire this capital
automatically. This is certainly one advantage of the Hungarian approach.
Alternatively, other sources of finance could be made available through
the banking system. Brainard (1990) argues that financial sector reform is
essential for rapid transformation. Rapid financial sector reform would
certainly assist the privatization effort. However, it cannot take placevery
rapidly, because the value of existing assets and liabilities of the banks
will not be known until the economy settles down to a more rational set of- 24-
pricesand the restructuring of the real side of the economy is complete. The
fear, based on experience, is that banks will make loans designed to save
existing assets rather than develop new ones if they are encouraged to lend
before their balance sheets are cleaned up.
Banks can help newly emerging companies by segregating financing of new
investments from their ongoing relationships, and governments may want to
funnel financial assistance from abroad through the banking system.
III. Other Privatizations.
Financial intermediaries, housing, agriculture, and land, will all have
to be privatized before the economies of the FSEs can be regarded as having
made the transformation to private market status. The FSEs have moved to two-
tier banking, with the central bank separated from commercial banks. Unless
the government is willing to guarantee the value of assets transferred at the
time of privatization, the banks will not find buyers until their balance
sheets are cleaned up. Cleaning up their balance sheets is likely to take
significant injections of funds and time. But the banks should in any case
not be privatized until an adequate regulatory apparatus is in place. Because
this too will take time, progress is urgent. Rapid development of the
regulatory framework is needed also so that new banks, including foreign
banks, and other financial institutions can begin to develop.
J'hile there is some private housing in all the FSEs, the bulk is state
owned, and there has been little attempt at privatization in the last few
years. It is well understood that until rents are raised to realistic levels,
and wages adjusted accordingly, there is little incentive for renters to buy
their houses or apartments. Because there are so many units to privatize,- 25-
becausecooperative arrangements in apartment buildings will have to be
developed, and because mortgage financing will have to be provided, the sale
of housing is likely to be very slow.It is nonetheless surprising that it
has received so little attention so far.
Agriculture is substantially private in Poland, but agriculture remains
mainly collectivized in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. There has been little
progress in decollectivization, and in land reform, and there is no agreed
strategy in these areas. By some reports, there has also been relatively
little pressure for reform from within the agricultural sector.
IV. Concluding Comments.
The progress that has been made in analyzing privatization options in the
FSEs and moving the analysis into legislation is remarkable. So is the
progress that has been made in dealing with the privatization of small
commercial and industrial firms. It remains true though that privatization of
large-scale firms has barely begun, and that the evidence is not yet in on
whether the ambitious Czechoslovak and Polish approaches will result in more
rapid privatization than the more piecemeal Hungarian approach. There are
great uncertainties about how the Czechoslovak and Polish approaches will
work, particularly when the stock market can begin to play a role, whether the
holding companies or mutual funds will be successful, and how rapidly it will
be possible to move on a major scale from commercialization to privatization.
The experience of the former East Germany, where the privatizationprocess --
basedon negotiated sales -- isgravely bogged down, is warning that there may
be major disappointments in store. It should also be emphasized that- 26-
privatizationhas soon to be tackled in other areas --financialinstitutions,
housing, and agriculture and land.
Given the magnitude of the task, it would be a mistake to discourage any
any potentially viable forn of privatizationthat is not theft. The pragmatic
apptoach being followed in Hungary, and in the privatization ofmedium scale
firms in Poland, gives promise of faster privatization than any monolithic
alternative.
What if privatization turns out to be slower than hoped? That will be a
setback setback to hopes for the rapid creation of a private sector. But the
success of small-scale privatizations, and the extraordinary growthof very
small firms, suggests that the key to the long-run transformation of the FSEs
may lie less in the privatization of the very largeindustrial firms -- some
of them dinosaurs --thanin the development of new firms and the growth of
existing smaller firms. For that reason, rapid progress in other areas,such
as the creation of a suitable legal environment, price decontrol,industrial
deregulation, and trade liberalization, is as important to the developmentof
a vibrant private sector as privatization of large firms.
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